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CONSPIRACY,	  SECURITY,	  AND	  HUMAN	  CARE	  IN	  DONNERSMARCK’S	  LEBEN	  DER	  ANDEREN	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  OF	  COMPARATIVE	  LITERATURE	  HARVARD	  UNIVERSITY	  CAMBRIDGE,	  MA	  02138	  USA	  	  jhamilt@fas.harvard.edu	  	  Abstract:	   Florian	   Henckel	   von	   Donnersmarck’s	   acclaimed	   film,	   Das	   Leben	   der	   Anderen	  (2006),	  affords	  a	  provocative	  opportunity	  for	  investigating	  the	  relation	  between	  conspiracy	  and	  security.	  Although	  state-­‐sponsored	  conspiracies	  breed	  insecurity	  among	  the	  citizenry,	  they	  nonetheless	  also	  provide	  the	  ground	  for	  epistemological	  security,	  insofar	  as	  the	  threat	  can	   be	   decisively	   located.	   In	   pressing	   the	   literal	   definition	   of	   security	  as	   “the	   removal	   of	  concern,”	  this	  article	  interprets	  the	  film	  according	  to	  shifting	  modalities	  of	  care.	  Considered	  as	   a	   vast	   conspiratorial	   network	   against	   its	   own	  populace,	   the	   East	   German	  Ministry	   for	  State	   Security	   (the	   Stasi)	   represents	   a	   mechanized,	   dispassionate	   ideal	   that	   strives	   to	  eliminate	   concerns	   about	  whatever	  may	   jeopardize	   the	   regime.	   To	   counter	   this	   security	  project,	   Donnersmarck	   presents	   us	  with	   characters	  who	   display	   a	   fundamentally	   human	  care	   that	   is	   instigated	  by	  governmental	  practices	   and	  yet	  ultimately	  works	   against	   state-­‐oriented	  securitization	  and	  legitimation.	  	  	  Keywords:	  Conspiracy	  theory,	  security	  theory,	  the	  ethics	  of	  care,	  East	  Germany’s	  Ministry	  of	  State	  Security	  (the	  Stasi)	  	  	  	  	  1.	  Conspiracy	  and	  Security	  Conspiracies	  have	  always	  been	  the	  source	  of	  both	  insecurity	  and	  security.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  as	  countless	  cases	  of	  victims	  from	  across	  history	  would	  attest,	  plots	  designed	  and	  executed	  by	  conspiring	  groups	  have	  been	  responsible	  for	  robbing	  individuals	  of	  their	  psychological,	  social,	   economic,	   political	   and,	   ultimately,	   existential	   security.	   Indeed,	   to	   be	   the	   target	   of	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true	  conspiratorial	  machinations	  generally	  portends	   the	  gravest	   consequences.	  Certitude,	  assurance,	   and	   confidence—components	   of	   a	   general	   understanding	  of	   security—quickly	  fall	  apart,	  leaving	  the	  casualty,	  if	  he	  or	  she	  should	  survive,	  without	  any	  ground	  on	  which	  to	  stand.	  Anyone	  may	  be	  involved;	  no	  one	  is	  to	  be	  trusted.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  for	  survivors	  at	  any	  rate,	  the	  discovery	  that	  a	  conspiracy	  does	  in	  fact	  exist	  affords	  a	  certain	  epistemological	  security.	  The	  presence	  of	  domineering	  agents	  who	  steer	  events	  from	  behind	  the	  scenes,	  the	  network	   of	   invisible	   or	   inaccessible	   forces	   which	   influence	   the	   manifest	   course	   of	   our	  political	  and	  social	  lives,	  the	  chain	  of	  motives	  which	  point	  to	  a	  single,	  master	  intention—all	  bespeak	   an	   explanatory	   power	   that	   transmutes	   contingency	   into	   necessity,	   arbitrariness	  into	   rationality,	   objectless	   angst	   into	   identifiable	   fear.	   Meaningless	   violence	   is	   thereby	  granted	   meaning,	   however	   sinister.	   In	   brief,	   the	   possibility	   of	   a	   conspiracy	   redeems	  experience	  from	  pure	  absurdity.	  It	  permits	  those	  so	  inclined	  to	  peer	  beneath	  the	  surface	  of	  things,	  to	  arrive	  at	  some	  originating	  point,	  which	  can	  settle	  what	  would	  otherwise	  persist	  under	  frustrating	  ignorance.	  Those	  affected	  may	  see	  their	   lives	  rendered	  utterly	  insecure,	  but	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  specific	  cause	  for	  their	  suffering	  or	  the	  suffering	  of	  others	  brings	  with	  it	  at	  the	  very	  least	  a	  securing	  rationale,	  an	  ability	  to	  locate	  the	  threat.	  	  These	  sense-­‐making	  effects	  may	  account	  for	  the	  popularity	  of	  conspiracy	  theories	  in	  many	   of	   today’s	   cultures,	   including	   the	   most	   far-­‐fetched	   and	   bizarre.	   After	   centuries	   of	  secularization	  have	  left	  us	  without	  recourse	  to	  ideas	  of	  fate	  or	  divine	  predestination,	  after	  historicism	   and	   moral	   relativism	   have	   falsified	   all	   teleological	   conceptions,	   after	   post-­‐modernism	  has	  demolished	  once	  and	  for	  all	  the	  validity	  of	  our	  grands	  récits,	  we	  are	  faced	  with	  an	  explicatory	  vacuum	  that	  remains	   to	  be	   filled.	  A	  conspiracy	   implies	   that	  disparate	  events	  are	  actually	   connected,	   that	   random	  occurrences	  are	  not	   random	  at	  all	  but	   rather	  consciously	  orchestrated.	  Brian	  Keeley	  thus	  argues:	  “Conspiracy	  theorists	  are	  […]	  some	  of	  the	   last	  believers	   in	  an	  ordered	  universe.	  By	  supposing	  that	  current	  events	  are	  under	  the	  control	  of	  nefarious	  agents,	  conspiracy	  theories	  entail	  that	  such	  events	  are	  capable	  of	  being	  
controlled.”1	  The	   point	   is	   valid	   for	   wildly	   imagined	   as	   well	   as	   for	   brutally	   verifiable	  conspiracies:	  Attaching	  subjective	  agency	  to	  evil	  occurrences	  works	  to	  clarify	  motives	  and	  intentions,	  which	   afford	   a	   systematic,	   causal	   account	   that	   dispels	   the	   possibility	   of	  mere	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Keeley	  1999,	  124	  (emphasis	  in	  text).	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chance.	   Thus,	   and	   perhaps	   most	   importantly,	   insofar	   as	   they	   involve	   human	   actors,	  conspiracies—however	   malicious,	   damaging,	   and	   fatal—invariably	   humanize	   the	   world.	  Instead	  of	  discounting	  catastrophes	  as	  the	  work	  of	  indifferent	  nature	  or	  inscrutable	  “acts	  of	  God,”	  misfortune	  can	  be	  attributed	   to	   real	  or	  presumably	   real	  human	  authors.	  Moreover,	  this	   immanent,	   human	   aspect	   recalls	   human	   limitations.	   The	   powers	   that	   control	   our	  experiences	  are	  not	  absolute.	  However	  improbable	  in	  most	  cases,	  conspirators	  qua	  human	  allow	  at	  least	  some	  room	  for	  negotiation.	  Men	  are	  neither	  machines	  nor	  gods.	  The	  very	  fact	  that	  conspirators	  must	  act	  secretly	  reminds	  us	  that	  they	  are	  not	  omnipotent.2	  	  The	  finite,	  human	  quality	  of	  conspiratorial	  organizations	  may	  serve	  as	  a	  further	  link	  between	   ideas	   of	   conspiracy	   and	   security.	   What	   makes	   this	   link	   explicit,	   I	   argue,	   is	   the	  “care”	   or	   “concern”—the	   Latin	   cura—that	   inheres	   in	   the	   term	   securitas.	   Following	   the	  term’s	  etymology,	  securitas	  aims	  to	  place	  “concern	  or	  anxiety”	  (cura)	  off	   to	   the	  side	  (se-­‐).	  	  Focused	   on	   the	   imminent	   future,	   cura	  consists	   in	   the	   intentionality	   that	   operates	  within	  human	  consciousness.	  Conspirators,	  no	   less	   than	  victims	  of	   conspiracy,	   express	   concerns	  that	  motivate	  the	  actions	  and	  thoughts	  that	  work	  to	  put	  those	  concerns	  to	  rest.	  Generally	  speaking,	   insecurity	   persists	  when	   all	  manners	   of	   concern	   (anxiety,	   fear,	   danger)	   linger;	  and	  security	  results	  when	  these	  areas	  of	  concern	  are	  brought	  under	  control.	  	  Conspiratorial	  plots	  and	  the	  theories	  that	  potential	  targets	  devote	  to	  disclosing	  them	  both	  strive	  for	  this	  control,	  for	  an	  ordering	  that	  would	  turn	  the	  imminent	  future	  into	  a	  matter	  of	  no	  concern.	  In	  this	   sense,	   the	   various	   security	   problems	   that	   emerge	   in	   connection	   with	   conspiracies	  hardly	   differ	   from	   security	   problems	   tout	   court.	   3 	  Such	   problems	   are	   based	   on	   the	  limitations	  humans	  must	  weigh	  in	  order	  to	  “take	  care”	  of	  anything.	  	  For	   this	   reason,	   security	   initiatives	   frequently	   depend	   on	   a	   variety	   of	   trans-­‐individual	  mechanisms,	   from	  governmental	   institutions	   to	   technological	  equipment.	   	  This	  dependence	   can	   be	   understood	   as	   motivated	   by	   a	   desire	   to	   transcend	   human	   finitude.	  Accordingly,	   security	   projects	   aim	   to	   remove	   us	   from	   concern	   by	   positioning	   multiple	  agents,	   organizations,	   or	   devices	   to	   be	   concerned	   in	   our	   stead.	   Sovereign	   bodies,	   which	  occupy	   a	   privileged	   place	   above	   the	   populace,	   can	   arguably	   foresee	   and	   identify	   threats	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  This	  point	  is	  raised	  by	  Keeley	  1999,	  116.	  	  3	  For	  a	  general	  account	  of	  the	  history	  of	  the	  term	  securitas,	  see	  Conze	  1972–97;	  Schrimm-­‐Heins	  1991.	  I	  offer	  a	  full	  discussion	  of	  the	  word’s	  long	  semantic	  career	  in	  Hamilton	  2013.	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better	  than	  others.	  The	  structure	  that	  defines	  this	  relation	  between	  the	  securing	  agents	  and	  those	   secured	  differs	   little	   from	   that	  which	  allows	  gadgets,	   devices,	   and	   sensors	   to	   catch	  what	   human	   senses	  might	  miss.	   In	   both	   cases,	   individual	   care	   is	   relegated	   to	   persons	   or	  machines	  that	  are	  designed,	  technologically	  or	  ideologically,	  for	  accuracy,	  promising	  others	  a	  life	  that	  would	  be	  literally	  carefree.	  	  To	   this	   end,	   the	   secured	   subject	   relinquishes	   the	   responsibility	   of	   self-­‐care	   by	  submitting	  to	  a	  higher	  authority,	  by	  obeying	  the	  will	  of	  a	  collective,	  or	  simply	  by	  trusting	  technology.	   	   This	   act	   of	   submission,	   which	   belongs	   to	   the	   broader	   system	   of	   trade-­‐offs	  historically	   linked	   to	   security	   programs—for	   example,	   an	   individual’s	   willingness	   to	  surrender	   certain	   human	   rights	   for	   greater	   safety—paves	   the	   way	   for	   abuse.	   It	   is	   not	  simply	   a	   horrific	   irony	   that	  within	   totalitarian-­‐minded	   regimes	   of	   the	   twentieth	   century	  bureaus	   explicitly	   founded	   to	   provide	   security	   have	   done	   so	   by	   instilling	   widespread	  insecurity	  among	  the	  populace:	   for	  example,	   the	  Soviet	  KGB	  (Комитет	  государственной	  безопасности,	   “Committee	   for	   State	   Security”),	   the	   Secuirtate	   police	   of	   communist	  Romania,	  and	  the	  notorious	  East	  German	  Stasi	  (Ministerium	  für	  Staatssicherheit,	   “Ministry	  for	  State	  Security”).	  Nor	  can	  the	  tactics	  of	  these	  infamously	  abusive	  organs	  of	  the	  State	  be	  restricted	  to	  the	  darker	  moments	  of	  recent	  history.	  They	  are	  arguably	  always	  potentially	  at	  the	   ready	  wherever	  power	   is	   exercised	  over	  a	  population.	   	  As	  Marc	  Crépon	  argues,	   state	  apparatuses	   are	   explicitly	   charged	   with	   inspiring	   fear	   so	   as	   to	   maintain	   the	   need	   for	  security.	   By	   exposing	   the	   people	   to	   a	   permanent	   menace,	   to	   perpetual	   insecurity,	   such	  organizations	  legitimize	  their	  existence.4	  	  However,	  one	  could	  further	  interpret	  the	  path	  to	  abuse	   according	   to	   shifts	   of	   concern.	  What	   appears	   to	   be	   an	   abuse	   of	   power	   or	   flagrant	  legitimization	  is,	  at	  least	  on	  one	  level,	  the	  conversion	  from	  the	  care	  for	  the	  individual	  to	  the	  care	  for	  the	  state.5	  	  	  Such	   techniques	   of	   securitization	   are	   dehumanizing	   when	   their	   concerns	   fall	  completely	   beyond	   the	   human.	   The	   greater	   irony,	   then,	   is	   that	   by	   instilling	   insecurity	  among	  the	  citizenry,	  by	  depriving	  its	  subjects	  of	  the	  privation	  of	  concern,	  agencies	  like	  the	  Stasi	   also	   allow	   their	   human	   subjects	   to	   continue	   to	   care,	   to	   remain	   human.	   Fear	   and	  anxiety—two	  perfectly	   adequate	   translations	   for	   cura—persist	  despite	  but	   also	  precisely	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Crépon	  2008,	  49.	  	  5	  Cf.	  Kleinschmidt	  2010,	  9	  –	  23.	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because	   of	   totalitarian	   security	  measures.	   Moreover,	   overwhelmed	   by	   their	   own	   human	  finitude,	  which	   is	   the	  base	   cause	  of	   their	   insecurity	   (understood	  as	   an	   incapacity	   to	  deal	  definitively	  with	   their	   concerns),	   individuals	   targeted	  by	   governmental	   conspiracies	  may	  be	  impelled	  to	  form	  conspiracies	  of	  their	  own.	  	  	  2.	  Human	  Care	  and	  the	  Security	  Machine	  The	  dynamics	  between	  security,	  conspiracy,	  and	  human	  care	  comes	  to	  the	  fore	   in	  Florian	  Henckel	   von	   Donnersmarck’s	   internationally	   acclaimed	   film	  Das	  Leben	  der	  Anderen	   (The	  
Lives	   of	   Others,	   2006),	   which	   unfolds	   a	   blatantly	   humanist	   tale	   beneath	   the	   dark	   and	  extensive	   shadow	   cast	   by	   the	   Stasi	   over	   the	   citizens	   of	   East	   Germany’s	   socialist	   state.	  Although	  the	  film	  has	  been	  criticized	  for	  its	  negligence	  of	  historical	  accuracy,	  it	  should	  not	  be	  faulted	  for	  presenting	  the	  Ministry	  for	  State	  Security	  as	  a	  vast	  conspiratorial	  network.6	  Catherine	  Epstein	  provides	  a	  concise	  and	  telling	  account	  of	  what	  the	  organization	  involved:	  	  One	   hundred	   seventy-­‐eight	   kilometers	   of	   archival	   material.	   Personal	   files	   on	   six	  million	   individuals.	   Forty	  million	   index	   cards.	   One	  million	   pictures	   and	   negatives.	  Thousands	   of	   human	   scents	   stored	   in	   glass	   jars.	   91,015	   full-­‐time	   employees.	  174,000	  “unofficial”	  informants.	  The	  highest	  surveillance	  rate	  (agents	  to	  population)	  in	   history.	   Husbands	   spying	   on	   wives.	   Colleagues	   snitching	   on	   co-­‐workers.	  Informants	   posing	   as	   dissidents.	   State	   officials	   harboring	   Red	   Army	   Faction	  terrorists.	  “Romeo”	  agents	  preying	  on	  hapless	  secretaries.	  Commandos	  kidnapping	  alleged	  traitors	  from	  West	  Germany.	  Agent	  provocateurs	  infiltrating	  literary	  groups	  and	  church	  circles.7	  	  	  Administration	  of	  this	  magnitude	  betrays	  a	  desire	  for	  comprehensiveness,	  an	  indefatigable	  ambition	   to	   encompass	   an	   entire	   population	   within	   the	   kind	   of	   tight	   order	   that	   is	   the	  hallmark	   of	   conspiratorial	   networks.	   The	   unprecedented	   scale	   of	   this	   generously	   funded	  ministry	   clearly	   aimed	   to	   keep	   each	   individual	   under	  watch	   like	   a	  nightmarish	   shepherd	  who	   never	   lets	   a	   single	   sheep	   wander	   from	   his	   gaze.	   Yet,	   whereas	   the	   ecclesiastical	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  The	   most	   outspoken	   critic	   of	   the	   film’s	   attention	   to	   historical	   facts	   is	   Jens	   Gieseke,	   who	   has	   written	  extensively	   on	   the	   Stasi;	   see	  Gieseke	  2008.	   For	   similar	   complaints,	   see	   Lindenberger	  2008.	   In	   both	   essays,	  Donnersmarck’s	  liberties	  with	  facts	  are	  compared	  with	  the	  data	  and	  analysis	  presented	  in	  a	  significant	  body	  of	  work	  on	  the	  Ministry	  for	  State	  Security,	  including	  Gieseke’s	  own	  work	  in	  Gieseke	  2000	  and	  2001.	  	  7	  Epstein	  2004,	  322.	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tradition	  of	  pastoral	   care	  worked	   toward	   the	  security	  of	   the	   flock—toward	  removing	   the	  concern	  of	  wolfish	  peril—here,	  the	  Stasi,	  as	  its	  name	  underscores,	  strove	  exclusively	  for	  the	  security	   of	   the	   state	   (Staatssicherheit),	   assiduously	   working	   to	   eliminate	   the	   threat	   of	  subversive	  individuals.8	  Despite	  their	  propagandistic	  claim	  to	  shield	  the	  populace	  from	  the	  fatal	   seductions	  of	  capitalism,	   in	  practice	   these	  ministers	  hoped	   to	  protect	   the	  state	   from	  the	   lure	  of	   individual	  difference.	   Consequently,	   in	  portraying	   the	  West	   as	   a	   site	  of	   greed,	  exploitation	   and	   violence,	   it	   intensified	   what	   was	   only	   implicit	   in	   the	   classic	   Plautine-­‐Hobbesian	  warning:	  homo	  homini	  lupus	   (“man	  is	  a	  wolf	   to	  man”),	  which	  should	  now	  read	  
homo	   civitati	   lupus	   (“man	   is	   a	   wolf	   to	   the	   state”).9	  The	   Stasi’s	   astounding	   quantities	   of	  human	  resources	  therefore	  represented	  a	  will	  to	  transcend	  the	  human,	  to	  transform	  each	  individual	  into	  an	  efficacious	  cog	  in	  the	  state	  machine.	  	  	  Donnersmarck’s	  film	  persistently	  demonstrates	  how	  trans-­‐individual,	   trans-­‐human	  security	   procedures	   carried	   out	   in	   the	   name	   of	   the	   state	   are	   undermined	   when	   human	  concerns	  or	   insecurities	  come	   into	  consideration.	  A	  nearly	  Manichaean	  dualism	  pervades	  the	   plot:	   human	   care	   versus	   the	  mechanistic	   removal	   of	   care.	   The	   story	   centers	   on	  Gerd	  Wiesler	   (Ulrich	   Mühe),	   an	   interrogations	   expert,	   committed	   socialist,	   and	   frighteningly	  effective	  Stasi	  officer.	  He	  has	  been	  assigned	  by	  his	  superior	  to	  monitor	  the	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  life	  of	  the	  renowned	  playwright	  Georg	  Dreyman	  (Sebastian	  Koch);	  and	  he	  initially	  performs	  this	  task	  with	   his	   usual	   discipline	   and	   clinically	   applied	  methods.	   At	   the	   film’s	   beginning	  we	  observe	  Wiesler	  as	  little	  more	  than	  a	  piece	  of	  some	  grand	  machine,	  a	  ruthless	  analyst	  with	  a	  keen	   sense	   for	   mendacity	   and	   prevarication,	   an	   efficient,	   self-­‐effacing	   master	   of	  wiretapping,	   surveillance,	   and	   enhanced	   observation.	   Expressionless,	   Wiesler	   sits	  absolutely	   still,	   a	   paradigm	   of	   patience,	   attention,	   and	   vigilance,	   living	   up	   to	   his	   weasel	  name.	  Equipped	  with	  headphones	  and	  a	  characterless	  sports	   jacket	  buttoned	  to	  the	  neck,	  this	  balding	  man	  almost	  perfectly	  blends	  into	  the	  cold,	  drab	  grey	  of	  the	  radio	  transmitters	  that	  surround	  him.	  The	  flesh	  of	  the	  face,	  although	  somewhat	  ashen,	  provides	  the	  only	  hint	  of	   living	   color.	  The	   technological	   gear,	  which	   replicates	  Wiesler’s	  motionlessness,	   further	  compromises	   this	   already	   diminished	   depiction	   of	   the	   human	   subject.	   The	   electronic	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  In	  alluding	  to	  “pastoral	  care,”	  I	  am	  referring	  particularly	  to	  Michel	  Foucault’s	  genealogy	  of	  “governmentality”	  in	  Foucault	  2007.	  	  9	  The	  famous	  phrase	  is	  from	  Plautus,	  Asinaria,	  495,	  and	  was	  cited	  by	  Thomas	  Hobbes	  in	  his	  dedication	  to	  De	  
Cive:	  “Epistle	  Dedicatory	  to	  the	  Right	  Honourable	  William	  Earl	  of	  Devonshire,”	  in	  Hobbes	  1998,	  3–4.	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components—the	   sound	   meters,	   the	   knobs,	   the	   switches	   and	   faders—seem	   to	   have	  transformed	   the	   figure	   into	   yet	   another	   instrument	   of	   technology,	   as	   if	   the	   human	   form	  were	   but	   a	   prosthetic	   extension	   of	   the	   system.	   This	   technologization	   of	   the	   human	   is	  underscored	   by	   the	   bureaucratic,	   numerical	   moniker—HGW	   XX/7—that	   chillingly	  supplants	  Wiesler’s	  proper	  name.	  Especially	  when	  compared	  to	   those	  under	  surveillance,	  HGW	  XX/7	  is	  an	  inhuman	  utensil,	  completely	  divorced	  from	  human	  community.	  The	   chiaroscuro	   of	   the	   film’s	   original	   poster	   emphasizes	   this	   point.	   Engulfed	   in	  darkness	   and	   shadow,	   Wiesler’s	   personhood	   fails	   to	   receive	   the	   light	   that	   illuminates	  Dreyman	  and	  his	  girlfriend	  Christa-­‐Maria	  Sieland	  (Martina	  Gedeck).	  The	  armor	  of	  Wiesler’s	  tightly	   buttoned	   jacket	   contrasts	   with	   the	   opened	   shirt	   collar	   of	   his	   victim	   wrapped	   in	  amorous	  embrace.	  HGW’s	  red	   fingerprint	  demonstrates	  how	  the	  agent	   is	  nothing	  outside	  the	   system	   that	   has	   inscribed	   him.	   Life—human	   life—belongs	   to	   others.	   As	   Eva	   Horn	  comments,	  “HGW’s	  loneliness,	  the	  fact	  that	  he,	  unlike	  his	  victims,	  has	  no	  life,	  reduces	  him	  to	  a	   mere	   listening	   device,	   sitting	   in	   the	   attic	   of	   the	   house	   at	   his	   listening	   post	   with	  headphones.	  He	   is	  a	  medium—and	  nothing	  but	  a	  medium.”10	  Yet,	  while	  Wiesler	   listens	   to	  what	  is	  taking	  place	  in	  Dreyman’s	  apartment,	  we	  the	  viewers	  are	  of	  course	  also	  observing	  Wiesler.	  HGW	  may	  be	  a	  mere	  medium	  for	  the	  state’s	  security	  initiatives,	  but	  for	  us	  he	  is	  a	  man	  who	  has	  been	  or	   is	   still	   in	   the	  process	  of	  being	  medialized.	  The	  portrayal	  decisively	  complicates	   our	   anxiety	   about	   invasive	   security	   methods	   by	   turning	   to	   the	   fragile	  individuality	  of	  the	  security	  officer	  himself.	  The	  mechanizing,	  dehumanizing	  effects	  visible	  in	   the	   shot	   signal	   a	   loss	   that	   the	   film	   diligently	   strives	   to	   restitute.	   Throughout,	   the	  oscillating	   focus	   from	   the	   victimized	   object	   of	   surveillance	   to	   the	   dehumanized	   agent	  illustrates	  how	  security	  projects	  potentially	  entail	  deprivations	  for	  all	   involved,	  how	  both	  the	  object	  and	  subject	  of	  security	  stand	  to	  lose	  something	  vital.	  	  Machines	  are	  designed	  to	  operate	  indifferently,	  without	  any	  feelings,	  which—among	  human	   beings—tend	   to	   compromise	   the	   task	   at	   hand.	   As	   an	   officer	   of	   state	   security,	  Wiesler	  must	  suppress	  any	  such	  emotional	  disturbance.	  It	  is	  noteworthy	  that	  the	  history	  of	  the	  term	  securitas	  points	  to	  an	  analogous	  logic	  of	  suppression.	  In	  De	  officiis	  Cicero	  submits	  the	  following	  definition:	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Horn	  2008,	  140.	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Vacandum	  autem	  omni	  est	  animi	  perturbatione,	  cum	  cupiditate	  et	  metu,	  tum	  etiam	  aegritudine	  et	  voluptate	  animi	  et	  iracundia,	  ut	  tranquillitas	  animi	  et	  securitas	  adsit,	  quae	  affert	  cum	  constantiam,	  tum	  etiam	  dignitatem.	  (Off.	  1.69)	  	  There	  must	  be	  freedom	  from	  every	  disturbance	  of	  the	  mind,	  not	  only	  rom	  desire	  and	  fear	  but	  also	  from	  distress,	  from	  the	  mind’s	  pleasure	  and	  anger,	  so	  that	  there	  may	  be	  present	   the	   tranquillity	   of	   the	   mind	   and	   the	   security	   which	   brings	   not	   only	  constancy	  but	  also	  dignity.	  	  	  Mindful	   of	   the	   etymological	   motivation	   of	   the	   word	   securitas,	   the	   list	   of	   troubling	  emotions—“desire,	   fear,	   distress,	   pleasure	   and	   anger”—should	   be	   regarded	   as	   the	   curae	  that	  threaten	  to	  agitate	  the	  mind	  and	  thereby	  rob	  it	  of	  its	  inner	  stability	  and	  integrity.11	  As	  a	  mental	   condition	   resulting	   from	   elimination,	   Cicero’s	   securitas	  comes	   to	   characterize	   the	  “blessed	   life”	   (beata	   vita)	   lauded	   by	   Hellenistic	   philosophers.	   Accordingly,	   the	   Latin	  negating	   prefix	   (se-­‐)	   corresponds	   to	   the	   Greek	   alpha-­‐privative	   that	   distinguishes	   well-­‐known	   ideals	   like	   Stoic	   apatheia	   (“the	   negation	   of	   disturbing	   emotions	   or	   pathē)	   and	  Epicurean	  ataraxia	  (“the	  negation	  of	   anything	   that	   aims	   to	   trouble	   [tarassein]	   the	   soul”).	  Historically,	   Cicero,	   like	  most	  of	   the	  Roman	  Stoics,	   link	   the	   calm	   state	  of	   securitas	  with	  a	  decisive	  withdrawal	   from	  the	  political	   forum,	  which	   is	   invariably	  depicted	  as	  a	  hotbed	  of	  overwhelming	   concerns	   (curae)	   and	   disruptive	   passions	   (pathē).	   By	   contrast,	   in	   the	  twentieth-­‐century	  context	  of	  Das	  Leben	  der	  Anderen,	  we	  can	  see	  how	  the	  politicization	  of	  the	  state’s	  own	  self-­‐securitization	  produces	  initiatives	  devised	  to	  quell	  any	  agitating	  attack	  from	  within.	  With	  this	  politicization	  comes	  a	  perversion	  that	  is	  especially	  discernible	  in	  the	  character	  of	  Wiesler:	  called	  upon	  by	  his	  government	  to	  preserve	  the	  stability	  of	  the	  regime,	  he	  becomes	  a	  parody	  of	  the	  dispassionate	  Stoic,	  no	  longer	  driven	  by	  the	  ideal	  of	  apatheia	  but	  rather	  mired	  in	  sheer	  apathy	  toward	  the	  human.	  	  Wiesler’s	   impassiveness,	   memorably	   performed	   by	   Mühe,	   plays	   out	   in	   a	   chilling	  scene	  early	  in	  the	  film,	  when	  he	  invites	  a	  prostitute	  into	  his	  somber,	  austere	  apartment.	  In	  his	   insightful	   reading,	  Gary	  Schmidt	   singles	  out	   this	  episode	  as	  exemplary	  of	   the	  dualism	  that	   he	   regards	   as	   operative	   throughout	   the	   plot,	   namely	   between	   feminine-­‐coded	  corporeality	  and	  masculine-­‐coded	  spirituality.	  Schmidt	  writes:	  “The	  film	  figuratively	  aligns	  the	   feminine	  with	   the	   state	   of	   fact	   (i.e.,	   the	  material	   world)	   and	   the	  masculine	  with	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  See	  also	  Cicero,	  Tusculanae	  Disputationes	  5.2.	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mental/spiritual	  world	  deemed	  to	  transcend	  the	  former.”12	  Although,	  as	  Schmidt	  brilliantly	  demonstrates,	  this	  tension	  motivates	  many	  of	  the	  screenplay’s	  characterizations,	  it	  fails	  to	  acknowledge	  the	  fundamental	  definition	  of	  the	  human	  itself	  as	  the	  conjunction	  of	  the	  body	  and	   soul—a	   conjunction	   that	   Wiesler	   must	   neglect	   so	   as	   to	   remain	   impassive	   to	   any	  corporeal	  or	  emotional	  impulses	  that	  would	  disturb	  his	  mission.	  In	  my	  view,	  the	  overriding	  tension	  that	  the	  film	  presses	  is	  rather	  the	  opposition	  between	  state-­‐oriented	  security	  and	  the	   human-­‐oriented	   cares	   that	   would	   undermine	   it.	   The	   peripeteia	   thus	   consists	   in	  redirecting	  Wiesler’s	  cura,	  not	  from	  the	  material	  to	  the	  spiritual	  but	  rather	  from	  the	  life	  of	  the	  state	  to	  the	  lives	  of	  other	  humans.	  	  	  The	  conversion	  begins	  as	  soon	  as	  Wiesler	  learns	  that	  Dreyman	  is	  being	  observed	  not	  because	   he	   is	   suspected	   of	   being	   a	   “subversive”	   but	   rather	   because	   the	   East	   German	  minister	   of	   culture	   is	   infatuated	   with	   and	   lusts	   after	   Sieland,	   who	   is	   living	   in	   the	  playwright’s	   home.	   The	   surveillance	   order,	   therefore,	   was	   not	   issued	   on	   the	   basis	   of	  concern	   for	   the	   regime’s	   security	   but	   instead	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   a	  wholly	   personal,	   sexually	  charged	   cura.	   Hardly	   a	   dangerous	   enemy	   of	   the	   state,	   Dreyman	   turns	   out	   to	   be	   an	  unsuspecting	   victim	   of	   conspiracy.	   As	   in	   a	   Roman	   tragedy,	   Dreyman	   is	   regarded	   by	   the	  state’s	  functionaries	  as	  an	  obstacle	  to	  be	  overcome,	  a	  rival	  who	  must	  be	  eliminated	  in	  order	  for	  the	  statesman	  to	  secure	  the	  object	  of	  his	  lascivious	  desire.	  The	   emergence	   of	   an	   all-­‐too-­‐human	   concern	   fatally	   disrupts	   the	   routinized	  procedures	  of	  the	  Stasi	  officer	  and	  essentially	  demechanizes	  Wiesler,	  who	  is	  suddenly	  and	  irreversibly	   recalled	   to	   his	   humanity.13	  He	   slowly	   but	   decisively	   becomes	   emotionally	  attached	   to	   Dreyman	   and	   Sieland,	   fascinated	   by	   the	   couple’s	   movements,	   their	  conversations,	   their	   intimacy.	   Wiesler’s	   increasing	   fondness	   eventually	   redefines	   the	  objective	  of	  his	  security	  enterprise.	  No	  longer	  acting	  as	  a	  political	  instrument	  for	  the	  state,	  Wiesler	   begins	   to	   protect	   the	   private	   lives	   of	   Dreyman	   and	   Sieland.	  He	   takes	   the	   risk	   to	  meet	  Sieland	  personally,	  whose	  own	  insecurity	  has	  led	  her	  to	  prostitute	  herself	  out	  of	  fear	  that	   she	   would	   otherwise	   ruin	   her	   acting	   career,	   first	   by	   sleeping	   with	   Bruno	   Hempf	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Schmidt	  2009,	  235.	  	  13	  It	  is	  precisely	  this	  humanization	  of	  the	  Stasi	  officer	  that	  many	  German	  critics,	  mindful	  of	  the	  horrors	  of	  the	  East	   German	   regime,	   found	   especially	   questionable;	   and	   this	   has	   been	   a	   fairly	   common	   critique	   among	  German	  scholars	  working	  on	  the	  film.	  For	  a	  brief	  overview,	  see	  Dueck	  2008.	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(Thomas	  Thieme),	   the	  repulsive	  Minister	  of	  Culture,	  and	   later	  by	  becoming	  an	   “unofficial	  informant”	  (an	  Inoffizieller	  Mitarbeiter,	  or	  IM)	  for	  the	  state.	  Wiesler	  meanwhile	  is	  shown	  to	  be	  less	  and	  less	  enthralled	  to	  the	  system	  that	  he	  once	  upheld	  so	  vigorously.	  Posing	  as	  a	  fan,	  Wiesler	  suggests	  to	  Sieland	  that	  her	  talent	  requires	  no	  patron.	  In	  appreciation	  and	  with	  a	  rare	  moment	  of	  sincerity,	  she	  thanks	  the	  stranger	  and	  tells	  him	  that	  he	  is	  “a	  good	  person”	  (ein	  guter	  Mensch).	  Subsequently,	  back	  at	  his	  listening	  post,	  Wiesler	  is	  pleased	  to	  hear	  her	  swear	  to	  Dreyman	  that	  she	  will	  no	  longer	  keep	  her	  sordid	  appointments	  with	  Hempf.	  It	  is	  as	   a	   human—as	   a	   good	  Mensch—that	   Wiesler	   is	   able	   to	   touch	   the	   lives	   of	   others	   and	  thereby	  begin	  to	  live	  himself.	  	  3.	  Humanization	  The	  state	   that	   cares	  only	   for	   itself	   can	  never	  provide	  security	   for	  anyone	  or	   for	  anything	  other	   than	   itself.	   Its	   security	  program	  exclusively	   removes	   the	   concerns	   that	   threaten	   its	  own	   legitimacy	   and	   power.	   Consequently,	   it	   effectively	   spreads	   insecurity	   among	   the	  populace.	  Sieland,	  too,	  must	  secure	  her	  own	  career	  by	  desecuring	  others.	  HGW	  opts	  out	  of	  this	   program	  altogether	  by	  becoming	  human,	   by	  becoming	  Gerd	  Wiesler,	  who	  ultimately	  learns	   to	   care	   for	  other	  humans	  and	   thereby	  provide	   them	  with	   safety.	  Dreyman,	  who	   is	  known	   to	  be	   a	  devoted	   communist,	   believes	   at	   first	   that	  he	  has	  nothing	   to	   fear.	  His	   own	  disillusionment,	  which	   parallels	  Wiesler’s,	   occurs	   during	   his	   birthday	   party	  with	   friends.	  This	  event	  broaches	  the	  uncomfortable	  issue	  of	  blacklisting	  artists	  and	  writers.	  Dreyman’s	  colleague,	   the	   theater	  director	  Albert	   Jerska	   (Volkmar	  Kleinert),	  who	  has	   suffered	  dearly	  from	  being	  blacklisted,	  hands	  over	  his	  birthday	  present	   to	  Dreyman:	   a	  piano	   score	  of	   an	  etude	  entitled	  “Sonata	  for	  the	  Good	  Man”	  (Sonate	  vom	  Guten	  Menschen).	  Wiesler	  is	  thereby	  brought	   into	  even	  closer	  proximity	  with	  his	   surveillance	   subject,	   because	  both	  have	  now	  been	   identified	   explicitly	   by	   the	   same	   human	   quality.	   Wiesler’s	   concern	   for	   Dreyman	   is	  therefore	  in	  a	  sense	  concern	  for	  himself.	  Days	  later,	  when	  Dreyman	  learns	  that	  Jerska	  has	  hanged	  himself,	  his	  anger	  and	  frustration	  impel	  him	  to	  write	  an	  article	  on	  suicide	  rates	  in	  East	  Germany,	  figures	  that	  are	  tightly	  suppressed	  by	  the	  state,	  again	  as	  a	  security	  measure.	  The	  plan	   is	   to	  publish	   the	  piece	  anonymously	   in	   the	  West	  German	  periodical	  Der	  Spiegel.	  Upon	   being	   baptized	   as	   a	   good	  man	   by	   the	   distraught	   Jerska,	   Dreyman	   could	   regard	   his	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birthday	   as	   a	   rebirth	   into	   humanity.	   At	   the	   piano,	   he	   plays	   through	   Jerska’s	   sonata,	   a	  rehearsal	   for	   the	   ode	   that	   he	  will	   compose	   on	   a	   typewriter’s	   keyboard	   and	   present	   as	   a	  memorial	  to	  his	  dead	  friend.	  To	  be	  human	  is	  to	  be	  mortal,	  to	  be	  prey	  to	  contingencies	  beyond	  one’s	  control.	  And	  Dreyman	  correspondingly	   takes	  necessary	  precautions	  before	   setting	  himself	   to	  work	  on	  the	  dangerous	  article.	  Fully	  aware	  that	  every	  typewriter	  in	  East	  Germany	  is	  registered	  with	  the	  state,	  he	  will	  write	  the	  piece	  on	  a	  miniature	  model	  that	  had	  been	  smuggled	  in	  from	  the	  West	  and	  is	  hidden	  beneath	  the	  floorboards.	  Furthermore,	  to	  confirm	  that	  his	  apartment	  is	  not	  bugged,	  he	  and	  his	  friends	  devise	  a	  ruse,	  pretending	  to	  be	  engaged	  in	  a	  smuggling	  plot.	  In	  other	  words,	  Dreyman	  stages	  a	  fake	  conspiracy	  in	  order	  to	  conspire	  securely	  against	  the	  state	   that	   has	   conspired	   against	   him.	   Wiesler	   refrains	   from	   contacting	   the	   authorities,	  which	  attests	  to	  his	  sympathy	  as	  well	  as	  convinces	  Dreyman	  (falsely)	  that	  he	  is	  not	  under	  watch.	  The	  playwright	  can	  proceed	  with	  his	  subversive	  writing	  relatively	  without	  concern,	  thanks	  of	  course	  to	  his	  unknown	  but	  effective	  protector.	  Wiesler	  is	  still	  a	  security	  agent,	  yet	  now	  an	  altogether	  “good”	  one—one	  who	  in	  fact	  provides	  security	  rather	  than	  promulgate	  insecurity	  and	  collective	  paranoia	  on	  behalf	  of	  a	  brutally	  inhuman	  regime.	  The	  apathy	   that	   ideally	   characterizes	  all	   instruments	  of	  mediation	   is	  overcome	  by	  increasing	  passion.	  Wiesler’s	  official	  reports	  are	  no	  longer	  accurate	  because	  his	  cura	  is	  now	  directed	   far	   from	   state	   matters.	   The	   disrupting	   emergence	   of	   strong,	   impassioned	  sentiment	   marks	   the	   replacement	   of	   political	   calculability	   by	   classical	   aesthetic	   feeling.	  Wiesler	   picks	   up	   a	   volume	   of	   Brecht’s	   poetry	   that	   he	   discovers	   on	   Dreyman’s	   desk	   and	  closely	   reads	   it	   through.	   The	  poem	   that	   is	   singled	  out	   in	   the	   film	   is	  Brecht’s	  well-­‐known	  lyric	   “Erinnerung	  an	  die	  Marie	  A.,”	  which	  dates	   from	  1920	  but	  was	   first	  published	   in	   the	  
Hauspostille	  collection	  of	  1927.	  The	  camera	  closes	  in	  on	  Wiesler’s	  face	  as	  he	  reads	  the	  text,	  yet	  in	  voiceover,	  it	  is	  Dreyman	  who	  is	  heard	  enunciating	  the	  lines:	  Und	  fragst	  du	  mich,	  was	  mit	  der	  Liebe	  sei?	  So	  sag	  ich	  dir:	  Ich	  kann	  mich	  nicht	  erinnern.	  Und	  doch,	  gewiß,	  ich	  weiß	  schon,	  was	  du	  meinst	  Doch	  ihr	  Gesicht,	  das	  weiß	  ich	  wirklich	  nimmer	  Ich	  weiß	  nur	  mehr:	  Ich	  küsste	  es	  dereinst.	  And	  should	  you	  ask	  me,	  what’s	  become	  of	  love?	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I’ll	  tell	  you:	  I	  cannot	  remember.	  And	  yet,	  certainly,	  I	  do	  know	  what	  you	  mean	  But	  her	  face,	  I	  really	  know	  no	  longer	  I	  only	  know	  now:	  I	  kissed	  it	  once.	  In	   addition	   to	   reinforcing	   the	   sympathetic	   relationship	   between	   Dreyman	   and	   Wiesler,	  between	  perpetrator	  and	  victim,	  the	  poem	  evokes	  the	  themes	  of	  transience,	  fleeting	  desire,	  and	   failed	   memory	   that	   define	   the	   human	   condition.	   The	   rapid	   alternation	   between	  knowing	  and	  not	  knowing	  is	  reflected	  in	  the	  repetition	  of	  forms	  of	  wissen	  (to	  know):	  gewiß,	  ich	   weiß	   schon	   …	   das	   weiß	   ich	   wirklich	   nimmer	   /	   Ich	   weiß	   nur	   mehr.	   The	   desire	   for	  certainty—Gewißheit,	   a	   concept	   closely	   linked	   to	   security—is	   both	   motivated	   and	  frustrated	  by	  the	  erstwhile	  lover’s	  concern.	  Moreover,	  these	  lines	  from	  Brecht’s	  “breviary”	  (Hauspostille)	  decidedly	  diverge	  from	  the	  conventional	  image	  of	  Brecht	  as	  someone	  who	  is	  politically	  engaged,	  ironic,	  and	  cynical.	  In	  the	  utterly	  private	  scene	  of	  Wiesler’s	  reading,	  the	  poetry	  serves	  to	  depoliticize	  art	  and	  is	  made	  to	  speak	  instead	  to	  transcendent	  and	  universal	  values,	  values	   that	  would	  appear	   to	  contradict	   the	  historical	  materialist	  vision	  associated	  with	  Brecht.14	  To	  be	   sure,	   the	   sympathetic	   relationship	  between	  Dreyman	  and	  Wiesler—that	  is,	  between	  a	  type	  of	  “actor”	  and	  “spectator”—militates	  against	  Brecht’s	  entire	  concept	  of	  epic	  theater,	  based	  as	  it	  is	  on	  breaking	  the	  illusion	  that	  would	  foster	  such	  identifications.	  These	  refunctionalizations	  of	  Brecht	  are	  fairly	  evident	  in	  the	  persistent	  references	  to	  “the	  good	   person”	   (der	   gute	   Mensch)—in	   Sieland’s	   remark	   to	   Wiesler	   and	   in	   Jerska’s	   piano	  etude,	   Sonate	   für	   einen	  guten	  Menschen,	   which	   at	   the	   film’s	   end	  will	   serve	   as	   the	   title	   of	  Dreyman’s	   memoir	   dedicated	   to	   agent	   “HGW	   XX/7.”	   These	   clear	   allusions	   to	   Der	   gute	  
Mensch	  von	  Sezuan	  both	  reinforce	  and	  disprove	  the	  lesson	  of	  Brecht’s	  parable:	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  as	  both	  Shen	  Te	  and	  Wiesler	  come	  to	  realize,	  in	  order	  to	  remain	  good,	  one	  must	  adopt	  masks	  and	  be	  willing	  to	  dissemble	  in	  a	  society	  that	  will	  ultimately	  abuse	  moral	  integrity;	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  and	  contrary	  to	  Brecht’s	  argument,	   it	   is	  only	   in	  the	  post-­‐Wende	  sphere	  of	  capitalist	  liberalism	  that	  such	  goodness	  can	  in	  fact	  flourish.	  In	  Das	  Leben	  der	  Anderen,	  humanization	  is	  consistently	  linked	  to	  a	  liberal	  view	  that	  poses	  as	  an	  apolitical	  position.	  Statements	  from	  the	  director	  corroborate	  this	  claim.	  In	  an	  interview	  with	  John	  Esther,	  Donnersmarck	  explains,	  “I	  really	  don’t	  believe	  there	  is	  such	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  On	  this	  point,	  see	  Stein	  2008,	  575;	  and	  Schmidt	  2009,	  243–44.	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thing	  as	  politics.	  It’s	  all	  about	  individuals.	  …	  So	  I	  tried	  to	  focus	  on	  individual	  psychology	  in	  the	  film.	  Rather	  than	  tell	  a	  political	  story,	  I	  show	  how	  people	  make	  the	  politics	  and	  how	  that	  affects	  people.”	  The	  director	  continues	  by	  recommending	  that	  one	  should	  “strike	  a	  balance	  between	  principle	  and	  feeling	  …	  between	  Vladimir	  Lenin	  and	  John	  Lennon.”15	  Metaphors	  of	  balancing	  commonly	  surface	  in	  discussions	  of	  public	  security:	  One	  does	  not	  have	  to	  conjure	  an	  entirely	  Orwellian	  scenario	  to	  find	  how	  security’s	  promise	  to	  eliminate	  fear	  or	  provide	  stability	   may	   encroach	   upon,	   compromise,	   or	   severely	   limit	   human	   freedom.	   Indeed,	  suspicions	   about	   exchanging	   liberty	   for	   security	   course	   through	   world	   history	   and	   are	  perhaps	   most	   popularly	   expressed	   in	   the	   over-­‐quoted	   line	   long	   attributed	   to	   Benjamin	  Franklin:	  “Those	  who	  would	  give	  up	  essential	  liberty	  to	  purchase	  a	  little	  temporary	  safety,	  deserve	  neither	   liberty	  nor	   safety.”16	  As	  we	  might	  expect,	   this	   intimation	  reaches	  back	   to	  classical	   Roman	   literature,	   for	   example	   in	   Livy’s	   account	   of	   the	   early	   Republic	   or	   in	  Horace’s	  lyric	  reflections	  on	  the	  dynamics	  of	  life	  within	  the	  burgeoning	  Empire.	  Throughout	  this	  long	  history,	  the	  cura	  about	  existential	  threats,	  which	  state	  security	  claims	  to	  exercise,	  is	  supplanted	  by	  a	  cura	  about	  the	  limitations	  and	  trade-­‐offs	  required	  for	  the	  former.	  In	  Das	  Leben	  der	  Anderen	  both	  species	  of	  cura	  characterize	  the	  human	  condition	  and	   hence	   a	   humanist	   ideal.	   Although	   it	   would	   be	   difficult—but	   not	   altogether	  impossible—to	  interpret	  Donnersmarck’s	  film	  within	  a	  purely	  Stoic	  context,	  it	  does	  appear	  to	   be	   sufficiently	   clear	   that	   the	   concerns	   exhibited	   by	   the	   story’s	   individuals	   (Wiesler,	  Dreyman,	  Sieland,	  among	  others)	  are	  designated	  by	  the	  passions	  or	  pathē	  that	  characterize	  what	   the	   filmmaker	   regards	   to	   be	   human.	   In	   the	   interview	   cited	   above,	   it	   is	   the	  impassioned	   music	   of	   John	   Lennon	   (perhaps	   as	   well	   as	   his	   deeply	   personal	   forays	   into	  political	   activism)	   that	   represents	   the	   basic,	   universal	   human	   feelings	   that	   must	   be	  summoned	   to	   balance	   against	   the	   rigorous,	   political	   program	   of	   Vladimir	   Lenin.	  Donnersmarck	   seems	   to	   regard	   this	   struggle	   between	  musical	   sentiment	   and	   ideological	  tenacity	  as	  central	  to	  the	  film’s	  conception.	  In	  another	  interview,	  he	  divulges	  that	  it	  was	  the	  old	   story,	   first	   related	   by	  Maxim	  Gorky,	   about	   Lenin’s	   love	   for	   Beethoven’s	   aptly	   named	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  Esther	  2007,	  40.	  	  16	  This	  sentence	  first	  occurs	  as	  a	  quote	  from	  a	  message	  to	  the	  governor	  from	  the	  Pennsylvania	  Assembly	   in	  Richard	   Jackson’s	   An	   Historical	   Review	   of	   the	   Constitution	   and	   Government	   of	   Pennsylvania,	   which	   was	  published	  in	  London	  by	  Franklin	  in	  1759,	  p.	  289.	  It	  was	  also	  used	  as	  the	  motto	  for	  the	  book’s	  title	  page.	  A	  later	  variant,	   also	   set	   in	   quotation	   marks,	   is	   found	   among	   Franklin’s	   notes	   for	   an	   address	   to	   the	   Pennsylvania	  Assembly	  in	  February	  1775,	  published	  in	  Franklin	  1818–19,	  1:	  517.	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Appassionata	   piano	   sonata	   that	   supplied	   the	   initial	   inspiration	   for	   the	   screenplay.	  According	  to	  Gorky,	  Lenin	  confessed,	  “I	  don’t	  want	  to	  listen	  to	  it	  because	  it	  makes	  me	  want	  to	  stroke	  people’s	  heads,	  and	  I	  have	  to	  smash	  those	  heads	  to	  bring	  the	  revolution	  to	  them.”	  Donnersmarck	   adds:	   “I	   suddenly	   had	   this	   image	   in	   my	   mind	   of	   a	   person	   sitting	   in	   a	  depressing	   room	  with	   earphones	  on	  his	  head	   and	   listening	   into	  what	  he	   supposes	   is	   the	  enemy	  of	   the	   state	  and	   the	  enemy	  of	  his	   ideas,	   and	  what	  he	   is	   really	  hearing	   is	  beautiful	  music	  that	  touches	  him.”17	  However,	  the	  optimism	  expressed	  here	  is	  qualified	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  at	  the	  film’s	  end,	  the	  two	  protagonists,	  Dreyman	  and	  Wiesler,	  fail	  to	  come	  into	  personal	  contact,	  even	  though	  the	  Wall	  has	  come	  down,	  even	  though	  the	  Stasi	  has	  been	  dissolved	  and	  the	  files	  are	  now	  a	  matter	  of	  public	  record.	  Nonetheless,	  the	  distance	  maintained	  between	  the	  two	  figures	  can	  also	  be	  regarded	  as	  the	  constitutive	  gap	  that	  is	  prerequisite	  for	  care.	  After	  the	  mechanism	  of	  State	  Security	  has	  been	  broken	  apart,	  the	  bonds	  of	  humanity	  are	  once	  again	  reinforced	  by	  the	  cura	  that	   joins	  us	  by	  keeping	  us	  separate.	  In	  Germany,	  the	  controversy	  sparked	  by	  this	   film	   essentially	   turned	   on	   the	   complaint	   that	   a	   Stasi	   officer	   was	   not	   depicted	   with	  sufficient	   cruelty.	  This	  presumed	   failure	  arguably	  denied	   today’s	  audience	  of	  a	  particular	  pleasure,	  namely	  to	  compare	  our	  present	  society	  with	  the	  recent	  past	  and	  thereby	  conclude	  that	  we	  are	  not	  as	  bad	  as	  people	  back	  then.	  In	  contrast,	  Donnersmarck	  appears	  to	  lodge	  a	  serious	  warning:	  we	   better	   hold	   on	   to	   our	   humanity,	   lest	   it	   disappears	   entirely	   into	   the	  warm	  bath	  of	   complacency.	  Conspiracies	   against	   the	  population	  no	   less	   than	   individuals’	  conspiracies	   against	   them	  will	   never	   accomplish	   a	   life	   that	   is	   carefree—which	   of	   course	  saves	  it	  from	  never	  becoming	  careless.	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